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THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: 
THE IMPACT OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS ON THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than half of the jail and prison inmates in the United States have 
a mental illness.1  As a result of the overrepresentation of individuals with 
mental illness in the criminal justice system, state courts are examining 
alternative options for meeting the challenges posed by the population of 
offenders with mental illness.2  Individuals with mental illnesses are enter-
ing the criminal justice system at a disturbing frequency.3  As a result, the 
criminal justice system has been forced to become a primary mental health 
care provider, a function for which these facilities are ill-equipped.4  As 
individuals with mental illness continue to flood the courtrooms of 
America, many jurisdictions are looking at alternatives to provide diver-
sions to incarceration.5 
This note addresses the evolving area of therapeutic jurisprudence in 
the context of problem-solving courts and, more specifically, examines the 
 
 *Winner of the North Dakota Bar Foundation Outstanding Note/Case Comment Award. 
1. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 213600, MENTAL 
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at http:// 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.  More specifically, 705,600 state prison inmates, 
78,800 federal prison inmates, and 479,900 local jail inmates have reported a mental health 
problem.  Id.  Mental health problems reported include major depression and psychotic disorders 
involving hallucinations and delusions.  Id. at 2. 
2. See DERECK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, RETHINKING THE 
REVOLVING DOOR 7 (2001), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/ 
rethinkingtherevolvingdoor.pdf (indicating that state courts are realizing that “business as usual” 
is not working for incarcerated mentally ill offenders). 
3. See Mark R. Munetz & Jennifer L.S. Teller, The Challenges of Cross-Disciplinary 
Collaborations: Bridging the Mental Health and Criminal Justice Systems, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 
935, 938-40 (2004) (discussing the prevalence of mental health problems among inmates in 
prison).  “[P]eople with mental illness are falling through the cracks of this country’s social safety 
net and are landing in the criminal justice system at an alarming rate.”  COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOV’TS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT xii (2002), available at 
http://consensusproject.org/downloads/Entire_report.pdf [hereinafter CONSENSUS PROJECT]. 
4. MARCIA K. GOIN, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM: REDIRECTING RESOURCES TOWARD TREATMENT, NOT CONTAINMENT 2 
(2004), available at http://www.psych.org/edu/other_res/lib_archives/archives/ 200401.pdf. 
5. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 6-7; see Christin E. Keele, Note, Criminalization 
of the Mentally Ill: The Challenging Role of the Defense Attorney in the Mental Health Court 
System, 71 UMKC L. REV. 193, 193 (2002) (explaining that problem-solving courts have gained 
support from politicians and the public due to the troubling trend of individuals with mental 
illness in the criminal justice system). 
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development of mental health courts.6  Part II defines the concept of 
therapeutic jurisprudence and problem-solving courts.  In addition, Part II 
examines the origins of the problem-solving court movement.  Part III 
analyzes the proliferation of mental health courts and discusses the structure 
and function of these unique courts.  Part IV provides insight into the 
complex role of defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges involved in the 
mental health court process.  Part V explores the implementation of mental 
health courts across the country, federal legislation relating to these courts, 
and controversies surrounding the mental health court model.  Finally, Part 
VI examines some of the issues related to mentally ill offenders in North 
Dakota and the possible impact of creating problem-solving courts. 
II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND PROBLEM-SOLVING 
COURTS: A NEW APPROACH 
A. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
Therapeutic jurisprudence refers to the study of how the law acts as a 
therapeutic agent.7  Within this concept, procedures, rules, and the legal 
roles that lawyers and judges play during the process of adjudication are all 
social forces that create consequences.8  The concept of therapeutic 
jurisprudence suggests that reducing the “anti-therapeutic consequences” 
created by the law can be accomplished without “subordinating due process 
 
6. See Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1055-56 (2003) (discussing the development of problem-solving 
courts).  Problem-solving courts are specialized court dockets that focus on addressing problems 
that lead to criminal justice involvement such as drug abuse, mental illness, or domestic violence.  
Id.  Although by nature traditional courts are “problem-solving,” the problems focused on by 
specialized problem-solving courts address underlying issues such as mental illness, drug abuse, 
and domestic violence with the goal of preventing the defendant from re-offending.  Id. at 1055.  
The traditional court process focuses on the problem of past behavior, the crime that occurred, and 
punishment of that behavior rather than on addressing how to keep the defendant from re-
offending.  Id. at 1055, 1060.  An example of one of the first problem-solving courts is the 
juvenile court created to address the problem of juvenile delinquency with a rehabilitative 
approach rather than a punitive approach provided by the traditional adult criminal court.  Id. at 
1056.  Mental health courts are specialized court dockets within the problem-solving court model 
that focus on the mentally-ill offender.  DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 7. 
7. GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING 
JUSTICE 49-50 (2005) [hereinafter BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS] (citing LAW IN A 
THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE xvii (David B. Wexler & 
Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996)).  Therapeutic jurisprudence has also been defined as the study of the 
extent that the law affects the physical and psychological interests of individuals in a community.  
Id. at 50. 
8. Id. at 49-50; see JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND 
THE COURTS 7-8 (Bruce J. Winick & David Wexler eds., 2003) (explaining that the “anti-
therapeutic consequences” relate to emotional and psychological issues confronted by the court in 
some cases, and the affect that the court has on these issues). 
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and other justice values.”9  The law’s impact on emotional well-being and 
overall mental health relating to offender’s psychological needs becomes a 
focus in the study of therapeutic jurisprudence.10 
Further, therapeutic jurisprudence has been used to analyze how laws 
and policies reflect attitudes about individuals who become involved in the 
criminal justice system.11  For example, the legal and social status of people 
with mental illness has been influenced by the law, social policy, and 
societal norms.12  People with mental illnesses are often thought of as 
having “incurable medical diseases that make them dangerous to society.”13  
Unfortunately, legal procedure and mechanisms have a direct affect on the 
autonomy of people with mental illness.14  New scientific and technological 
advances in treatment for mental illnesses have provided a means for courts 
to help facilitate rehabilitation for offenders with mental illness.15  Because 
a significant number of people with mental illness are involved in the 
criminal justice system, it is of paramount importance that the legal system 
reflects the new advances and incorporates the theoretical concepts of 
therapeutic jurisprudence.16 
B. PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 
Problem-solving courts are defined as specialized courtrooms “that are 
working to ensure not just that the punishment fits the crime . . . but that the 
process fits the problem.”17  Problem-solving courts not only address issues 
of disputed fact, but also focus on underlying social or psychological 
problems responsible for the dispute.18  Problem-solving courts seek to 
connect defendants to therapeutic interventions including rehabilitative 
 
9. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 49. 
10. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 7. 
11. William Spaulding et al., Applications of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Rehabilitation 
For People with Severe and Disabling Mental Illness, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 135, 136 (2000). 
12. Id.  Some laws require a specific diagnosis of a mental illness when determining legal 
competence, culpability for crimes, or eligibility for public services.  Id. at 137; see 53 AM. JUR. 
2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 10 (2006) (stating that a showing of mental illness is required for 
civil commitments). 
13. Spaulding et al., supra note 11, at 140. 
14. See id. at 136 (indicating that laws that relate to public safety have been created to 
directly address problems associated with mental illness). 
15. Id. at 151-55.  “Just as . . . judges dealing with patent cases need to understand basic 
principles of engineering, judges performing in a problem-solving capacity . . . need to under-
stand . . . the science of human behavior.”  JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 7. 
16. See Spaulding et al., supra note 11, at 170 (suggesting that the therapeutic jurisprudence 
perspective can help provide more informed decision-making by using advancements in mental 
health research for better outcomes for both society and the mentally-ill defendant). 
17. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 5. 
18. Winick, supra note 6, at 1055. 
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drug treatment and mental health treatment.19  The focus of these courts 
have a common underlying premise; courts should recognize and 
understand the social or psychological problems behind a dispute and solve 
these problems in a way that ensures that the offender will not return to 
jail.20  Doing so will ensure that society is better protected.21  Drug courts, 
domestic violence courts, unified family courts, and mental health courts 
are all examples of problem-solving courts that have been created across 
the United States.22 
C. ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM-SOLVING MOVEMENT 
Before the creation of specialized problem-solving courts, judges and 
lawyers faced enormous pressure to process cases quickly with little regard 
for the defendants, communities, or victims involved.23  As caseloads began 
to rise, traditional courts began to develop systems that sought to achieve 
 
19. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 32; see Michael C. Dorf & 
Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1501, 1508 (2003) (explaining that a web of “reciprocal accountability” is created 
between mental health providers, courts, and defendants that reach beyond the conventional 
adversarial approach). 
20. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 32. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 7-8; see Winick, supra note 6, at 1056 (discussing specialized courts established to 
address specific issues).  Drug courts are specialized courts created in response to the failure to 
address addictive behavior problems when processing drug possession charges that are 
nonviolent.  Id. at 1056.  As a result, the offenders often resume abusing drugs after release from 
prison and end up back in court.  Id.  Drug courts emphasize the offender’s rehabilitation, and 
defendants who agree to participate are monitored with mandatory drug testing.  Id. at 1057; see 
generally OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG COURTS: THE SECOND 
DECADE (2006), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/211081.pdf (explaining the 
proliferation and success of drug courts across the United States).  Domestic violence courts focus 
on psychological problems associated with batterers and often require attendance in batterer 
intervention programs, along with strict monitoring of court orders.  BERMAN & FEINBLATT, 
GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 7-8; see, e.g., Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, The 
Development of a Specialized Domestic Violence Court in Vancouver, Washington Utilizing 
Innovative Judicial Paradigms, 69 UMKC L. REV. 139, 139 (2000) (demonstrating the impact of 
a domestic violence court as a catalyst for system reform).  Unified family courts concentrate on 
addressing the legal, emotional, and social problems associated with family law cases.  Barbara A. 
Babb & Judith D. Moran, Substance Abuse, Families, and Unified Family Courts: The Creation of 
a Caring Justice System, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 3-4 (1999); see also Susan L. Brooks 
& Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice and Family Court Reform, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 453, 455 
(2002) (noting that unified family courts address all of the family’s issues in one court and use 
therapeutic jurisprudence to concentrate on the underlying problems occurring within the family). 
23. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, in JUDGING IN 
A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 76; see BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 
7, at 17 (noting that many courts “lack a coherent logic” and few resources are used to address 
issues such as mental illness and drug abuse which fuel increases in caseloads). 
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tangible outcomes, such as reduced recidivism.24  Many judges became 
frustrated with not having the ability to address the underlying problem 
even when following appropriate procedures and making certain that the 
litigant’s legal rights were protected.25  Former Minnesota Chief Justice, 
Kathleen Blatz, summarized what judges experienced by noting, “You 
know, I feel like I work for McJustice: we sure aren’t good for you, but we 
are fast.”26 
Traditional courts have not been able to adequately address the 
underlying problems associated with mentally ill defendants stemming from 
lack of intervention.27  The traditional court process has been described as 
measuring performance by process rather than by outcomes.28  In many 
cases, the conventional processing of a case resulting in short-term jail, 
probation, and “sentences where the offender is basically told to stay out of 
trouble,” fails to address how to prevent the criminal behavior from 
occurring in the future.29  Increased recidivism has generated broad effects 
that strain court resources, overcrowd jails, and result in ineffective 
treatment.30  As a result, the problem-solving movement emerged by 
borrowing strategies from other disciplines such as alternative dispute 
resolution, therapeutic jurisprudence, and juvenile courts to deal with issues 
surrounding criminals who are being recycled through the system.31  Within 
the problem-solving model, courts focus on valuing emotional well-being 
and human needs by using therapeutic jurisprudence as a theoretical 
foundation.32  Judges and attorneys become problem-solvers rather than 
 
24. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, in JUDGING IN 
A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 79.  Recidivism refers to a tendency toward habitual, 
repeated criminal activity.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (8th ed. 2004). 
25. See Winick, supra note 6, at 1060 (explaining that the traditional court model did not 
address the underlying problem, and it re-emerged requiring further judicial intervention). 
26. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, in JUDGING IN 
A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 77. 
27. See Gregory L. Acquaviva, Comment, Mental Health Courts: No Longer Experimental, 
36 SETON HALL L. REV. 971, 974 (2006) (noting that judges have become frustrated with the 
“traditional handling of mentally ill offenders”).  The adversarial approach may be effective for 
some criminal cases, but not for other “minor” cases involving shoplifting or petty drug offenses.  
BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 4. 
28. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 27. 
29. Id. at 17. 
30. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 975. 
31. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 39. 
32. See Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, “From Day One”: Who’s in Control as Problem 
Solving and Client-Centered Sentencing Take Center Stage?, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
11, 14 (2004) (explaining that many defense lawyers who use a client-centered advocacy 
approach are trying to address the underlying problems that brought the defendant into court in the 
first place); see also James R. Walker, Getting the Mentally Ill Misdemeanant Out of Jail, 6 
SCHOLAR 371, 392 (2004) (suggesting that a therapeutic justice approach can effectively deal with 
“chronic, relapse-prone” disorders). 
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simply “case processors,” and view their cases as more than just matters to 
be adjudicated.33 
Today, more than 2000 problem-solving courts exist in the United 
States.34  All of these courts share special characteristics relating to the 
structure and function of processing cases.35  Problem-solving courts are 
defining success in innovative ways and are forced to think thoroughly 
about outcomes of the court process, not only for the defendant, but also for 
the community.36  With more involvement of judicial authority, judges stay 
closely involved in problem-solving courts and promote compliance with 
orders.37 
Additionally, problem-solving courts recognize that rising caseloads 
are part of a larger social problem within a community.38  For example, 
drug addiction and mental illness are recognized as social problems that 
contribute to the rising caseload.39  Problem-solving courts try to under-
stand what is fueling the caseload and also the underlying problems that 
brought the person to court in the first place.40  Furthermore, problem-
solving courts bring new tools from a variety of disciplines such as govern-
ment, non-profit organizations, and human service agencies to achieve their 
goals.41  Moreover, existing legal actors take on new roles.42  Judges in 
problem-solving courts seek to “resolve both the judicial case and the 
problem that produced it.”43  The role of attorneys changes from an adver-
sarial approach to a team approach when working with social workers and 
other court members to implement a successful plan ensuring that the 
problem is resolved and the defendant does not have a reoccurrence of the 
criminal behavior.44 
 
33. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 5. 
34. Id. at 9 (“Every state has at least one.”). 
35. Id. at 34-35. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 35. 
38. Id. at 36. 
39. See Winick, supra note 6, at 1060 (explaining that mental illness and drug addiction 
problems often require “repeated judicial intervention”). 
40. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 36. 
41. Id. at 36-37.  For example, connecting people to community resources, monitoring pro-
gress, and ensuring that needed services and treatment are provided are tools developed by other 
agencies that problem-solving courts apply in the court process.  Winick, supra note 6, at 1061. 
42. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 37. 
43. Winick, supra note 6, at 1061. 
44. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 37. 
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 
Mental health courts (MHCs) are problem-solving courts that use the 
therapeutic jurisprudence model with collaboration from mental health care 
professionals to provide mental health treatment to offenders in an attempt 
to prevent repeated criminal activity.45  MHCs are created in an effort to 
divert offenders with mental illness away from jail and prison.46  Moreover, 
MHCs were created out of the problem-solving court model to address the 
underlying problems fueled by caseloads involving mentally ill offenders.47  
Also, the MHCs have been developed in response to the repeated occur-
rence of problem behavior that requires the court to intervene each time it 
occurs.48  In order to examine how MHCs emerged on the American legal 
landscape, it is necessary to explain how and why mentally ill offenders 
have become a large segment of the criminal population in courts, jails, and 
prisons across the country.49 
A. IMPACT OF DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Beginning in the 1950s, the need for the institutionalization of the 
mentally ill began to decrease as a result of more effective treatment 
options, such as psychiatric medications.50  In the 1970s, civil commitment 
statutes were being changed to make it more difficult to commit mentally ill 
individuals into mental institutions.51  During the 1970s, legislators and 
reformers wanted to change policies related to civil commitments to reflect 
the least restrictive means possible to treat mentally ill patients.52  The 
gradual shift of individuals from state-operated mental hospitals to 
 
45. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 985-86. 
46. Id. at 985.  Mental health courts were created in response to the overrepresentation of 
individuals with mental illnesses involved in the criminal justice system.  COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOV’TS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, A GUIDE TO MENTAL HEALTH COURT DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2005), available at http://consensusproject.org/mhcp/Guide-MHC-Design 
.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS].  In comparison to other responses to this problem, 
the MHC approach involves a court docket that is only composed of defendants with mental 
illnesses, and there is a team-based monitoring system.  Id. at 2. 
47. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 3-4. 
48. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 974-75.  Traditional interventions have not addressed the 
underlying problem resulting in a re-emergence of the problem “necessitating repeated judicial 
intervention.”  Id. at 975. 
49. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 2 (explaining that a variety of causes can be 
linked to the “phenomenon” of the increasing number of mentally ill offenders in prison). 
50. Id. at 2.  Psychiatric medications created the option of treatment on an outpatient basis 
for many severe mental disorders.  Id. at 2.  Medications, such as Chlorpromazine, reduced 
deviant behaviors in patients and allowed them to be treated in the community rather than in an 
institution.  Walker, supra note 32, at 378. 
51. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 2. 
52. Id. 
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community-based treatment is often referred to as “deinstitutionalization.”53  
Deinstitutionalization impacted the number of individuals with mental 
illness, who were forced out of hospitals and back into the community to 
receive treatment, because many could be treated on an outpatient basis 
rather than requiring institutionalization.54  However, many mentally ill 
individuals returned to their communities only to find no resources or 
community-based treatment services available.55 
B. THE COURTS’ ROLE IN DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Over time, the courts have had an impact on the deinstitutionalization 
process.56  Courts began to intervene and strike down statutes that 
authorized involuntary hospitalization of those who were non-violent.57  
For example, in Lessard v. Schmidt,58 a federal district court held that a 
Wisconsin statute relating to civil commitment should be struck down on 
the basis that it had no connection with the state’s goals in regard to the 
criminal justice system.59  The plaintiff in Lessard had the right to 
challenge the involuntary civil commitment order if it could be shown that 
she was not a danger to society.60  The state’s interests were not furthered 
by her commitment.61  Therefore, the court recognized that the civil 
commitment procedures did not provide adequate due process.62 
Additionally, in 1975, the United States Supreme Court held in 
O’Connor v. Donaldson63 that a state cannot confine an individual who is 
not a danger to his or her community and who is capable of surviving 
without assistance.64  In O’Connor, the Supreme Court held that ordering a 
civil commitment cannot be based on a showing of mental illness alone.65  
If the mentally ill person is not a danger to society, the state cannot confine 
 
53. Id. 
54. See GOIN, supra note 4, at 2 (explaining that in 1955, the population of mental hospitals 
was 559,000, and in 1999, it was approximately 80,000). 
55. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 3; see GOIN, supra note 4, at 2 (suggesting that 
the integration of people with mental illnesses back into the community was never adequately 
funded). 
56. See LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts 
in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255, 268-69 
(2001) (explaining the impact of court intervention on deinstitutionalization). 
57. Id. at 268. 
58. 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). 
59. Lessard, 413 F. Supp. at 1320. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 1319. 
63. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
64. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576. 
65. Id. at 575. 
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the individual to a mental hospital.66  Many states began to amend their 
statutes relating to civil commitment and individuals with mental illness left 
the state mental health hospitals to receive community-based treatment.67  
However, community treatment options were not made available, leaving 
many mentally ill people with no support services.68  The difficulty in pro-
viding access to treatment in the community was an “unintended conse-
quence” of the shift resulting from the change in public policy.69  In what is 
often referred to as a “mass exodus,” deinstitutionalization caused a 
dramatic change in the way communities accommodate individuals with a 
mental illness.70  Many communities were not prepared for the impact of 
deinstitutionalization and are still trying to find resources to provide 
services for mentally ill persons in the community.71 
A recent case shows the Supreme Court’s recognition of the 
importance of community based treatment in providing the least restrictive 
means of treatment for mentally ill people who do not pose a threat to 
society.72  The United States Supreme Court held in Olmstead v. L.C.73 that 
states must provide community-based treatment when mental health 
professionals determine that the patient can be better served in the 
community, rather than in a state mental hospital.74  The Court based its 
decision on provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
which impacted anti-discrimination policies relating to individuals with 
disabilities in public services.75  Both the Olmstead decision and the ADA 
have corrected discrimination experienced by individuals with mental 
 
66. Id. 
67. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 3. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 980; see Walker, supra note 32, at 378 (noting that the 
“mass exodus” describes the dramatic shift of the mentally ill from institutions into the 
community). 
71. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 3 (noting the lack of access to mental health 
treatment in the community and indicating that “transinstitutionalization” is the term often used to 
explain the rise of mentally ill offenders in prisons after deinstitutionalization from state mental 
health facilities began). 
72. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999) (holding that when mental health profes-
sionals determine a patient can be accommodated in the community, transfer from an institutional 
setting to community-based treatment is appropriate). 
73. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
74. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607. 
75. Id. at 592.  “Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 
by any such entity.”  Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006). 
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illness.76  Even though court involvement created many improvements in 
the well-being of individuals with mental illness, the lack of available 
community-based treatment options left some individuals receiving no 
treatment.77 
C. THE REVOLVING DOOR 
Often referred to as the “revolving door,” mentally ill offenders are 
repeatedly recycled through the criminal justice system when they return to 
jail without receiving appropriate treatment for their illness after living in 
the community.78  In many cases, the “revolving door” process traps men-
tally ill offenders.79  The process often starts with offenders committing a 
petty crime, such as urinating in public or shoplifting, and, in many situa-
tions, the petty crime leads to incarceration, followed by release, and ending 
in prison for another offense.80  However, an offender’s mental condition 
often deteriorates while in jail, and his or her mental decline contributes to 
an already present mental illness.81  The problems surrounding offenders 
trapped in the “revolving door” have forced the criminal justice system to 
re-examine how to cope with offenders who have serious mental illness.82 
D. ILL-EQUIPPED JAILS AND PRISONS 
Jails and prisons are often ill-equipped to provide for the needs of 
mentally ill offenders.83  Treating such offenders in a prison requires time, 
which is why many inmates with mental illnesses serve longer sentences 
than other prisoners who have committed the same crime.84  “Our jails, 
 
76. See generally Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can 
Sanist Attitudes be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 15 (1993-94) (explaining that the ADA is the 
most far-reaching federal legislation relating to the discrimination of people with disabilities). 
77. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 3. 
78. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 974-75. 
79. Kondo, supra note 56, at 257. 
80. Id.  “In Florida, a mentally ill homeless man was arrested for shoplifting a $1.16 ice 
cream sandwich.  He was imprisoned because he lacked the $25 bail necessary for release.”  Id. at 
256.  Twenty-five percent of state prisoners and jail inmates with mental illness have served an 
average of three or more previous incarcerations.  JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 1, at 1. 
81. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 979-80. 
82. Id. at 977. 
83. Richard A. Marini, Mental Health Courts Focus on Treatment; Criminals Often 
Overlooked in Traditional System are Sentenced to Hospital Care, in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC 
KEY, supra note 8, at 60. 
84. See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 1, at 8 (indicating that state prisoners with mental 
illnesses serve a reported five months longer than prisoners without mental illnesses); see also 
PAULA DITTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 147633, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF 
INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 8 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
mhtip.pdf (explaining that mentally ill prison inmates served more time than inmates without 
mental illness). 
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whether we like it or not, are becoming [the nation’s] largest mental-health 
facilities.”85  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, fifty percent of 
prison inmates and thirty-four percent of jail inmates report receiving 
medication to treat mental illness while incarcerated.86  In many respects, 
the criminal justice system has become the mental health system for men-
tally ill offenders who populate jails and prisons.87  The fact that people 
with mental illness are overrepresented in jails and prisons across the nation 
indicates that the public mental health systems are not adequate or acces-
sible to those in need of it.88 
In addition, many jails and prisons find that they cannot provide the 
adequate care necessary to treat seriously mentally ill inmates.89  In Estelle 
v. Gamble,90 the United States Supreme Court held that when prisoners are 
subjected to “deliberate indifference” by prison staff providing for the 
medical needs of the inmate, there is a violation of the Eighth Amendment 
which involves “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”91  The Court 
noted that denying medical treatment to prison inmates causes pain and 
suffering that does not serve a “penological purpose.”92 
For example, in Coleman v. Wilson,93 the federal court for the Eastern 
District of California held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires states to provide for the “basic human needs of prison 
inmates.”94  This obligation includes access to appropriate mental health 
care.95  The court noted that proving a violation of the right to appropriate 
care depends on whether the deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” or 
whether it is a serious medical need without which the inmate’s condition 
would deteriorate.96  Also, there must be “deliberate indifference” by the 
 
85. Kondo, supra note 56, at 257. 
86. DITTON, supra note 84, at 9. 
87. See GOIN, supra note 4, at 2 (“Our jails and prisons . . . have become the primary mental 
health care facilities in the United States today”). 
88. See DENCKLA  & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining that many people with mental 
illness live in their communities with inadequate support services). 
89. See Jeff Wellborn, Responding to Individuals with Mental Illness, FBI LAW 
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Nov. 1999, at 6 (noting that law enforcement officers are trained to 
enforce the law and not necessarily trained to interact with mentally ill persons). 
90. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
91. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).  
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
92. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. 
93. 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
94. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1297. 
95. Id. at 1298 (citing Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
96. Id.; see Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 578 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment was violated where the lack of mental health care involving a once-per-month visit to 
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prison staff to provide care to the inmate.97  However, the court noted that 
although the inmate might be receiving treatment for his or her mental 
illness, it might not be adequate.98  Under those circumstances, an Eighth 
Amendment claim would not be appropriate unless it was found to be 
“deliberately indifferent.”99 
In some cases, jail staff fail to provide adequate treatment necessary for 
mentally ill inmates.100  For example, in 1998 the Seventh Circuit decided 
Lawson v. Trowbridge,101 where an individual with schizophrenia was 
placed in solitary confinement without receiving the medication he 
needed.102  Between November 19, 1993, and March 3, 1994, Lawson did 
not receive any medication for his mental illness.103  In a retrial, a jury 
awarded Lawson four hundred thousand dollars in compensatory damages 
and five million dollars in punitive damages.104  Lawson provides an 
example of a situation involving an ill-equipped jail that was not able to 
provide appropriate treatment for a severely mentally ill inmate.105 
These cases demonstrate that jails and prisons were never intended to 
be mental hospitals.106  Often, inmates leave prison in the same condition 
they came in as, or worse, they leave prison with a deteriorating mental 
condition that went untreated while incarcerated.107  Ill-equipped jails and 
prisons have contributed to the revolving door process when mentally ill 
offenders are released and are unable to access community-based treat-
ment.108  Recognizing this problem, courts have developed innovative 
approaches to address the complex problems that arise with mentally ill 
 
the prison from a psychiatrist was found to be “ridiculously pathetic” and not reasonably 
adequate). 
97. Coleman, 912 F. Supp at 1298. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS 94 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf 
(explaining that many prisons do not provide necessary mental health care to inmates). 
101. 153 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 1998). 
102. Lawson, 153 F.3d at 371-72. 
103. Id. 
104. JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, Federal Jury Awards 
$5.4 million in Damages for Solitary Confinement of Prisoner with Schizophrenia, http:// 
www.bazelon.org/newsroom/archive/1999/3-10-99lawson.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2006). 
105. See id. (stating that the Lawson case is important because it recognized the problem of 
inadequate mental health treatment in jail). 
106. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that jails and prisons were not 
intended to be psychiatric institutions). 
107. Id. at 3-4. 
108. Id. at 4; see, e.g., Alan Feuer, Out of Jail, Into Temptation: A Day in a Life, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2002, at A1 (providing insight into the life of a released drug offender and the 
potential likelihood for re-offending). 
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defendants who commit petty crimes and are recycled through the 
system.109  One of these innovations is the development of MHCs.110 
E. THE PROLIFERATION OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 
Today, there are approximately 150 MHCs across the United States.111  
The structure and process of MHCs requires collaboration between the 
criminal justice and mental health systems in a community because both 
systems often collide when people with mental illness end up in jail.112  The 
collaboration of the mental health system and criminal justice system to 
address the needs of the mentally ill offender is a necessary component to 
the effectiveness of MHCs.113 
MHCs have been defined as specialized dockets where participants 
with mental illness voluntarily agree to a treatment program developed by a 
team comprised of mental health providers and court personnel.114  MHCs 
are based on the problem-solving court model, which involves focusing on 
the underlying problem behind a defendant’s introduction to the criminal 
justice system.115  Non-adherence to the treatment plan may be sanctioned, 
while adherence may be rewarded.116  In some cases, incarceration may be 
the appropriate option for mentally ill offenders who pose serious threats to 
public safety.117  However, for those who do not pose threats to the public 
nor have violent criminal records, incarceration may not make sense.118  
Because of the alarming rate at which mentally ill offenders are entering the 
criminal justice system, many states have developed MHCs in an effort to 
address problems such as overcrowding, recidivism, and strained 
 
109. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 59. 
110. Id. 
111. E-mail from Nesa Wasarhaley, Research Assistant, Council of State Governments (June 
22, 2007 16:19:30 CST) (on file with author); see NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, 
SURVEY OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS (2005) [hereinafter SURVEY] (indicating that as of 
December 2005, there were more than 113 MHCs); see also COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 
MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A NATIONAL SNAPSHOT, http://www.consensusproject.org/mhcourts/ 
national-snapshot.pdf (indicating that as of June 2005, more than 125 MHCs were implemented in 
the United States). 
112. Munetz & Teller, supra note 3, at 935. 
113. See id. at 937 (explaining that an important step to successful collaboration is the ability 
of the mental health system and the criminal justice system to work together to find solutions). 
114. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 2. 
115. Id. at iv. 
116. Id. at 2. 
117. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 1. 
118. See id. (noting that the significant costs and the lack of a therapeutic environment in the 
prison setting are obvious drawbacks to incarcerating mentally ill offenders that do not have 
violent criminal records). 
      
238 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:225 
resources.119  Also, MHCs are utilized to provide adequate and appropriate 
treatment, which some offenders might not have had access to otherwise.120 
According to Judge Randal B. Fritzler, creating a MHC that can be 
utilized as an instrument of risk management requires restructuring the 
court process.121  Judge Fritzler provides ten key components that are 
necessary in structuring MHCs.122  First, a specialized team must be created 
to manage the cases involving offenders who are mentally ill.123  The team 
should be comprised of attorneys, mental health workers, and the judge.124  
Second, labeling and stigmatization should not be allowed inside the court-
room.125  It is important not to label defendants based on their medical 
diagnoses.126  Third, sentencing processes should involve an incentive, such 
as avoiding conviction.127  Fourth, the least restrictive means should be 
used to get clients into supportive programs.128  The means by which this is 
done should always take into account public safety.129  Fifth, the court 
should encourage the welfare of the defendant by promoting the 
enhancement of basic treatment options available.130  Next, the sixth 
component provides that the court should support autonomous decision-
making relating to the defendant’s mental health issues with suggestions 
from the mental health team.131  Also, the seventh component notes that the 
technical rules of the courtroom should not apply in the MHC 
environment.132  This prohibition creates more meaningful participation 
among legal actors in the courtroom, as opposed to an adversarial 
approach.133  The eighth component in structuring a MHC is the drafting of 
 
119. Id. at 7. 
120. Ronda Cress et al., Mental Health Courts and Title II of the ADA: Accessibility to State 
Court Systems for Individuals with Mental Disabilities and the Need for Diversion, 25 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 307, 332-33 (2006). 
121. Judge Randall B. Fritzler, 10 Key Components of a Criminal Mental Health Court, in 
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 118. 
122. Id. at 118-21. 
123. Id. at 118. 
124. Id.; see COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 63 (noting that the mental health 
court team typically is comprised of a judicial officer and treatment provider, or case manager, 
who provide direct services to defendants). 
125. Judge Randall B. Fritzler, 10 Key Components of a Criminal Mental Health Court, in 
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 119. 
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a manual that includes the client’s rights and the specific procedures that 
will be adopted by the court.134  Ninth, the opportunity to intervene and get 
treatment for the client should be utilized as soon as the client is arrested.135  
The time soon after the participant is arrested is when the defendant might 
be more receptive to receiving the help that he or she needs.136  Finally, a 
dedicated court team that has a meaningful review process concerning the 
needs of the client is required in order to structure the MHC in a way that 
effectively addresses the underlying problem.137  The court team must 
consistently reassess the participant’s response to treatment in order to 
provide risk management.138  The ten components are important because 
they establish how the MHC should be structured to provide the benefits of 
a problem-solving court approach.139 
Also, along with the restructuring of the court process, the MHC 
approach expands the traditional roles of the judge and attorneys.140  As the 
structure and process of the court changes, the defense attorney, prosecutor, 
and judge play important roles in providing a meaningful review process of 
the mentally ill defendant in a MHC.141  The next section will examine how 
the roles of defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges are expanded in 
MHCs. 
IV. STAKEHOLDERS IN THE MENTAL HEALTH COURT: A 
NONTRADITIONAL ROLE 
The development of problem-solving courts, such as MHCs, requires 
collaboration with policy-makers and mental health providers to address 
gaps in the system.142  Interaction between public health agencies in the 
community, mental health advocates, and the court system is necessary to 
ensure that mental health care is accessible and affordable for offenders 





137. Id. at 121. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 118. 
140. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 63. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 61-62; see THE PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, 
ACHIEVING THE PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 1 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/FinalReport/downloads/ExecSummary 
.pdf (noting the fragmented mental health system is a substantial obstacle for getting effective 
treatment). 
143. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 62. 
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in MHCs.144  The development of the courtroom team expands the 
traditional professional roles of attorneys and judges by shifting away from 
an adversarial approach.145  Instead, defense attorneys may find themselves 
trying to extend supervision when necessary.146  Prosecutors may find 
themselves working for the best interest of the defendant, and judges may 
find themselves acting more like probation officers or social workers, rather 
than “impartial arbiters of fact.”147 
A. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 
The unique role of the defense attorney within the MHC model 
continues to encompass the traditional role of advocating for the best 
interests of the client.148  However, the role of translator and representative 
becomes even more important for clients with serious mental illnesses.149  
Because budget cuts in social services and deinstitutionalization fuel large 
workloads, defenders are finding it necessary to re-examine effective 
strategies for their clients with serious mental illness.150  Further, where 
appropriate alternatives are available, defense attorneys can help the client 
find meaningful, effective treatment.151 
On the other hand, many defense attorneys have paid little attention to 
alternatives, innovative diversions, and negotiations for their criminal 
clients.152  Examples of these alternatives include community education 
alternatives, training programs, and treatment programs.153  Other stake-
holders in the criminal justice system view defense attorneys as being too 
focused on the client instead of on treatment programs and community 
safety.154  Moreover, some defenders avoid the problem-solving model 
 
144. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 5. 
145. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 63. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 75.  Counsel should be appointed as soon as 
possible when a person enters the system because there are “critical stages” that occur prior to 
trial.  ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 77-78 (3d ed. 
1992). 
149. CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 74. 
150. Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 32, at 18-19. 
151. CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 74.  “[A]ttorneys have a responsibility to know 
about the mental health resources in the community—both their quality and their availability—
that might be appropriate for clients with mental health issues . . . .”  Id.  Also, pretrial services 
agencies or programs can identify individuals who might need special treatment before trial.  
NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVICES, NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS AND COMMENTARY 55 
(2004), available at http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/ corrections/pretrial/napsaStandards2004.pdf. 
152. Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 32, at 13-14. 
153. Id. at 22. 
154. Id. at 13-14. 
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because they fear that it compromises their ethical conduct in advocating 
zealously for their client.155  As traditional roles change, new ethical ques-
tions arise.156  However, it has always been the role of defense attorneys to 
protect fairness in the system and the dignity of an accused client in the 
process.157  Defense attorneys should embrace the development of alterna-
tives such as MHCs in providing effective services for clients.158 
When a case is heard using the problem-solving court model, the 
defense attorney focuses on the sentencing and treatment stages, rather than 
on the culpability stage.159  “Winning” a case has a new meaning within the 
problem-solving court model.160  “Winning means preserving human dig-
nity and helping clients become productive and peaceful members of a 
community.”161  As defenders become part of the solution, effective advo-
cacy provides better outcomes for the client and community.162 
When defense attorneys look to alternative approaches for mentally ill 
clients, they should look for opportunities that will meet the needs of the 
mentally ill client and opportunities that will serve justice at the same 
time.163  One of the first steps for defense attorneys is to identify those 
clients who have mental illnesses.164  By identifying a client who has a 
serious mental illness, the defense attorney can ensure the identification of 
appropriate alternatives.165  Also, the defender can help clients’ families 
navigate the criminal justice system to ensure successful outcomes.166  
Although some defense attorneys are uncomfortable with this non-
traditional approach, advocating for the best possible choice for the client 
 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 14. 
157. Id. at 19. 
158. See id. at 19 (explaining that defense counsel should take the initiative “to stake out the 
parameters of their ethical duties” as responsibilities shift beyond sentencing). 
159. Id. at 23. 
160. Id. at 22-23. 
161. Id. at 23. 
162. Id. at 21-22.  New models of defense lawyering offer the chance for defenders to be 
“part of the solution, improving the community as a whole.”  Id. at 22.  When defense attorneys 
help clients get into programs, such as specialty courts, the potential for repeating the offense is 
reduced resulting in a better outcome for the community.  Id.  Also, helping the client get 
treatment for drug abuse or find employment is an important objective in defining the meaning of 
“winning” in a problem-solving court.  Id. at 23. 
163. CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 72. 
164. Id. at 74. 
165. Id. at 75. 
166. Id. at 76.  For example, the Urban Justice Center provides families with a handbook 
detailing the criminal justice process and advice for working with defense attorneys.  Id. 
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and contesting the merits of the case are still encompassed within the 
problem-solving approach.167 
B. PROSECUTORS 
In concurrence with the nontraditional role that defense counsel 
assumes in the MHC model, prosecutors’ roles also expand when maxi-
mizing the use of alternatives through pretrial diversion.168  While changes 
occur within this role, there are also important traditional goals that must be 
retained by the prosecutor.169  Preserving the best interests of justice re-
mains an important consideration.170  Within the traditional framework of 
judicial process, offering a defendant the opportunity to participate in a 
MHC program can also serve the best interests of justice.171 
When confronted with an offender with a mental illness, the prosecu-
tor’s chief concern is public safety.172  Because prosecutors often view 
mentally ill offenders as being recycled through the criminal justice system, 
many prosecutors are now considering alternatives with the hope of 
reducing recidivism.173  By focusing on risk assessment and case targeting 
alternatives, such as MHCs, prosecutors remain committed to general 
societal welfare.174 
In traditional cases, prosecutors rely on criteria such as an offender’s 
criminal record, danger to society, the nature of the offense, and the wishes 
of the victim in deciding whether the individual should be offered an 
alternative to the traditional criminal proceedings.175  When the offender is 
mentally ill, a prosecutor should also consider whether the individual was 
receiving treatment in the community for a mental condition.176  Also, 
prosecutors should consider the relationship between the mental illness and 
the behavior that resulted in arrest.177  This approach is different from the 
 
167. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 116-17. 
168. CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 82. 
169. Id. at 82 n.7. 
170. Id.  “The prosecutor plays an important role in the diversion process—he initiates the 
movement into diversion, and he must judge the efficaciousness of diversionary treatment.”  
NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, No. 11.8 cmt. at 154 (Nat’l Dist. Att’ys Ass’n 1977).  The 
prosecutor must keep “the rights of society in a paramount position.”  Id. at 9. 
171. See CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 82 (explaining that the “best interests of 
justice” can be served by addressing the underlying problem that led to an offense). 
172. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 19. 
173. Id. at 20. 
174. See id. (explaining that case targeting focused on defining eligibility for those who do 
not pose a serious threat of violence is crucial to the prosecutor’s priorities). 
175. CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 82. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
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traditional judicial practice because it involves considering what would be 
the best outcome for the defendant.178 
Furthermore, in the nontraditional approach, the collaboration between 
the defense and prosecution continues past the planning stage and into the 
implementation of the treatment program.179  The prosecutor, along with 
the defense counsel should encourage the offender to succeed in the pro-
gram.180  In order to maintain effective collaboration, prosecutors in the 
MHC should respond to probation violations with adjustments to treatment 
programs, rather than imposing punishment.181 
C. THE JUDGE 
By applying a collaborative approach in the problem-solving frame-
work, the judge takes on a leading role.182  The judge provides motivation, 
inspiration, and direction to decide how the legal actors in the courtroom 
will play their parts.183  The collaborative philosophy puts the judge’s focus 
on “solving problems” and not just “deciding cases.”184  In the context of 
problem-solving courts, such as MHCs, the judge’s role is more proactive, 
and the judge explores a larger range of solutions.185  Judges in problem-
solving courts often “think outside the box” to create better alternatives that 
solve the underlying problem.186 
Generally, the role of the judge in a conventional court involves the 
judge in an authoritative, formal position, looking primarily at prior prece-
dent and focusing on past behavior or conduct.187  However, in problem-
solving courts, the judge acts as a coach providing effective collaboration to 
provide a common sense plan for the defendant to stay out of jail.188  This 
nontraditional approach is more “people-oriented” rather than “claim or 
 
178. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 63. 
179. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 37. 
180. See id. at 37 (indicating that attorneys work together in implementing a treatment plan 
to encourage success in the program). 
181. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 63. 
182. See JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 5 (suggesting that judges take a 
lead role in coordinating what happens in a problem-solving court). 
183. Id. 
184. Donald J. Farole Jr. et al., Applying Problem-Solving Principles in Mainstream Courts: 
Lessons for State Courts, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 57, 68 (2005). 
185. See id. at 62-63 (indicating that judges determined that the problem-solving role allows 
them to provide individualized court orders which is helpful in negotiation situations). 
186. Id. at 63. 
187. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 6 (citing Judge Roger K. Warren).  
“Tradition dictates that judges serve as neutral arbiters and that their work focus on process and 
penalties.”  BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 105. 
188. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 6 (citing Judge Roger K. Warren). 
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case-oriented.”189  Moreover, the judge’s interaction with a defendant does 
not end when a final decision has been reached.190  Instead, defendants are 
required to report back to judges regarding their progress.191  Often, judges 
learn about the defendant’s personal problems and family life.192  For 
example, a judge in Los Angeles County explained that he encourages 
defendants to speak about their treatment needs and side effects from 
medications, and the judge orders regular progress reports from physi-
cians.193  This direct interaction between the defendant and judge can moti-
vate offenders to make progress.194  In this role, judges “[treat] defendants 
with respect, [show] compassion, hav[e] faith in their ability to improve, 
and [see] them as potential law-abiding citizens.”195 
Skeptics suggest that judges using this new approach focus on 
rehabilitation instead of individual responsibility.196  However, the require-
ments of treatment plans in problem-solving courts make it necessary for 
defendants to do more in regard to hours of treatment, attendance in court 
sessions, and responsibility than is required in other conventional courts.197  
The judge remains the final link in a chain of supervision composed of the 
mental health and criminal justice staff.198 
Another problem that judges face with MHCs is limited time and 
resources.199  The lack of time and money for these types of courts and the 
pressure to “move cases along” has been noted as one of the most 
significant barriers to the judicial role.200  Furthermore, judges often have to 
deal with attorneys who are not familiar with the problem-solving approach 
adopted by MHCs.201 
The collaborative philosophy of the MHC model requires the legal 
actors to take on new roles.202  Defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges 




191. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 109. 
192. Id. 
193. Kondo, supra note 56, at 291. 
194. Farole et al., supra note 184, at 63. 
195. Id. 
196. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 98. 
197. Id. at 108. 
198. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 67. 
199. Farole et al., supra note 184, at 66-67. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 115 (acknowledging that 
in the problem-solving court model, judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys collaborate as a 
team). 
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provide effective advocacy.203  Along with traditional goals, such as 
providing the best interests of justice and protection of public safety, the 
nontraditional goals, such as providing effective treatment, should also be 
considered when advocating for the best outcome for mentally ill offenders 
in the problem-solving court environment.204 
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 
The application of therapeutic jurisprudence in the courtroom led to the 
development of MHCs across the United States.205  MHCs have imple-
mented a non-adversarial approach with the judge eliciting collaboration 
from the mental health team.206  All states that have implemented MHCs 
share the common goal of diverting mentally ill offenders away from “the 
criminal process to the treatment in the community that they need.”207  This 
section will provide examples of MHCs that have been created in Florida 
and Minnesota and explain the response of Congress in relation to the 
positive outcomes of MHCs.208  Further, the controversy surrounding the 
implementation of MHCs will be examined through perspectives of both 
proponents and critics of MHCs.209 
A. BROWARD COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT 
In 1997, the first MHC was created in Broward County, Florida.210  
Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren explained that the court was created “out of 
desperation.”211  This desperation was the result of too many mentally ill 
offenders being recycled through the criminal justice system.212  The MHC 
 
203. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 52 (understanding basic information 
about mental illness is necessary for court practitioners in a MHC). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 5. 
206. Kondo, supra note 56, at 291. 
207. JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 8, at 59. 
208. See SURVEY, supra note 111, at 14, 25 (providing descriptions of the Broward and 
Hennepin County MHCs). 
209. See Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 507, 507-08 (2005) (noting the arguments of those who support and 
oppose the implementation of MHCs). 
210. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 983; see JUDGE GINGER LERNER-WREN, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE CTS., BROWARD’S MENTAL HEALTH COURT: AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO THE 
MENTALLY DISABLED IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2000), available at http:// 
www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_ProSol_Trends99-00_FlaMentalPub.pdf.  “The mis-
sion of the Mental Health Court is to better address the unique and complex needs of the mentally 
disabled misdemeanant defendant arrested for nonviolent offenses.”  Id. 
211. Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 984-85. 
212. See id. (stating that Broward County received a report concerning the “severe 
shortfalls” in the mental health system). 
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in Broward County operated under the therapeutic jurisprudential frame-
work, where the court acted as more than an adjudicator by taking an active 
role in finding effective treatment for offenders with mental illness.213 
An example of a typical case coming before the Broward County MHC 
involves a person who is charged with loitering in front of a convenience 
store.214  When brought to court, the person is often visibly agitated and 
fighting off the escorts who brought the person into the room.215  To a 
conventional court, this behavior might appear to threaten public safety.216  
However, after considering the defendant’s past record and mental 
condition, Judge Lerner-Wren may conclude that the person’s conduct was 
a result of mental illness, and not the result of having a “criminal mind.”217 
To be eligible to participate in the MHC in Broward County, the 
offender must have an Axis I serious mental illness, brain impairment, or 
developmental disability.218  Candidates for the court are typically iden-
tified by jail staff who are involved with the intake of the offender.219  Also, 
offenses that qualify for the MHC include all misdemeanors except 
domestic violence and DUI.220  If the eligibility requirements are met, the 
alternative that offenders are offered in Broward County is a supervised 
treatment plan for one year while charges are temporarily set aside.221  In 
serious cases, a guilty plea may be required with credit for time served.222  
If a defendant does not adhere to the treatment plan, the sanctions include 
incarceration, change in treatment, and a hearing before the judge.223  An 
evaluation of the Broward MHC found that most participants appearing 
before the court perceived that it provided an “opportunity to have their 
 
213. Kondo, supra note 56, at 287. 
214. Id. at 286. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 287. 
218. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 28 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM IV] (indicating that Axis I disorders 
include severe depression and anxiety disorders); SURVEY, supra note 111, at 14 (explaining the 
criteria for eligibility in the Broward County MHC). 
219. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 8. 
220. SURVEY, supra note 111, at 14.  If the charge is battery, the victim’s consent is required 
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voice[s] heard.”224  Moreover, the participants indicated that they did not 
perceive the experience to be coercive.225 
B. HENNEPIN COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH COURT 
After the Broward County MHC opened the door to a new court 
model, many counties began to plan and implement MHCs.226  In 2003, 
Hennepin County, Minnesota, established a MHC.227  The Hennepin 
County MHC has approximately 100 participants per year and is funded by 
the Bureau of Justice Assistance along with funding from the county.228  
The court team is composed of a mental health screener from the county 
human services agency, a probation officer, a judge, and two attorneys.229  
For offenders to be considered for participation in the MHC, a mental 
health screener will make an initial decision on eligibility.230  Participants 
must have either an Axis I231 or Axis II232 mental illness and the offense 
must be a non-violent felony or misdemeanor.233  The program also accepts 
offenders who have a co-occurring substance abuse problem.234  The final 
decision on eligibility for the MHC remains with the judge, defense 
attorney, and prosecutor.235  In order to qualify, the judge will require a 
guilty plea, and the offender will be placed on probation.236  If a participant 
successfully completes the program, the case can be dismissed or the charge 
 
224. Louis de la Parte Fla. Mental Health Inst., Univ. of S. Fla., The Effectiveness of the 
Broward Mental Health Court: An Evaluation, POLICY BRIEF, Nov. 2002 at 2, available at 
http://www.fmhi.usf.edu/institute/pubs/newsletters/policybriefs/issue016.pdf. 
225. Id.  Results from an evaluation of the Broward County MHC indicated that: 
The issue of coercion and its use permeates mental health law and policy, particularly 
though not exclusively with the on-going debate over civil commitment laws.  
Whether individuals perceive a particular intervention as coercive is important in 
assessing how coercive a particular intervention might be.  The mental health court is 
perceived by those enrolled in the study as very non-coercive. 
Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). 
226. See generally SURVEY, supra note 111, at intro (indicating that in 2005, there were 
approximately 113 MHCs across the United States). 




231. DSM IV, supra note 218, at 27-28.  Axis I mental illnesses include major mental 
disorders, learning disabilities, and developmental disabilities.  Id. at 28.  Some examples of Axis 
I mental disorders include anxiety disorders, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia.  Id. 
232. Id. at 28-29.  Axis II mental illnesses include pervasive personality conditions and 
mental retardation.  Id. at 29.  Some examples of Axis II mental disorders include borderline 
personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and narcissistic personality disorder.  Id. 
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and sentence may be reduced.237  If the participant does not successfully 
complete the program, the case is returned to the conventional criminal 
court to be processed as a traditional criminal case.238 
The implementation of MHCs has resulted in positive reports of 
placing non-violent mentally ill offenders in judicially monitored treatment 
programs.239  With the positive results from successful MHCs, Congress 
recognized the need for better alternatives for mentally ill offenders.240  As 
a result of the implementation of MHCs, funding to create more innovative 
alternatives to incarceration for mentally ill offenders was initiated by the 
United States Congress.241 
C. FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
As a result of the increased awareness of alternatives to incarceration 
for mentally ill offenders, Congress enacted the Mentally Ill Offender 
Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004.242  The purpose of the Act 
was to increase collaboration between the criminal justice system and the 
mental health system in order to facilitate public safety and provide 
treatment options for mentally ill offenders.243  Another purpose of the Act 
was to increase communication between professionals and elected officials 
about the problems surrounding mentally ill offenders.244 
Prior to the Act, Congress authorized monetary grants to states, state 
courts, local courts, units of local government, and Indian tribal govern-
ments for the development of MHCs.245  The Mentally Ill Offender 
Treatment and Crime Reduction Act (MIOTCRA) funded the Justice and 
Mental Health Collaboration Program, which is administered by the Bureau 
of Justice Assistance (BJA).246  In response to the overwhelming number of 
offenders with mental illnesses, Congress further examined how resources 
can be used more effectively to deal with the population of offenders.247  




239. See America’s Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project, Pub. L. No. 106-515 
§ 2(5), 114 Stat. 2399, 2399 (2000) (finding positive results from the implementation of MHCs). 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. 42 U.S.C. § 3797aa (2006). 
243. 150 CONG. REC. S11261 (Oct. 11, 2004). 
244. Id. 
245. 42 U.S.C. § 3796ii (2006). 
246. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, MENTAL HEALTH COURTS PROGRAM, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/mentalhealth.html (last visited June 18, 2007). 
247. See id. (indicating that the MHC program seeks to implement and mobilize 
communities to find effective treatment for offenders with mental disabilities). 
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officers, judges, prosecutors and police are in unique agreement that our 
broken system of punting the most seriously mentally ill to the criminal 
justice system must be fixed.”248 
Funding from the Act can be used to develop MHCs or other programs 
providing alternatives to jail that meet requirements established by the 
United States Attorney General.249  Testimony given in support of the Act 
provided evidence of the concern that both mental health providers and 
criminal justice officials are confronted with an overwhelming number of 
mentally ill offenders entering prisons, jails, and courtrooms across the 
country.250  Congress did not mandate a “one size fits all” approach.251  The 
MIOTCRA permits communities to find appropriate alternatives that 
provide better mental health treatment, whether via MHCs, or other 
programs within the community, such as training for personnel in the 
system or other court-based programs.252 
The MIOTCRA of 2004, and America’s Law Enforcement and Mental 
Health Project, fund the Mental Health Courts Program conducted by the 
BJA.253  Reducing the amount of contact that mentally ill offenders have 
with the criminal justice system is a focus of the grant program provided by 
the BJA.254  The grant program provides funds to programs that connect 
clients with housing, treatment, employment, and adequate support ser-
vices.255  Also, the program supports projects that emphasize judicial 
supervision that continues while the individual is in the program.256  In 
addition, projects that stress intensive collaboration between mental health 
providers, case managers, and criminal justice personnel are necessary to 
receive grants from the BJA.257  Qualified offenders for the programs 
 
248. Impact of Mentally Ill Offenders on the Criminal Justice System: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 21 (Sept. 21, 2000) 
(statement of Rep. Ted Strickland). 
249. 42 U.S.C. § 3797aa (b)(5)(I)(i). 
250. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration: Hearing on S. 1194 Before the Subcomm. on Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 108th Cong. 41 (2003) 
(statement of Gloria Walker, National Alliance for the Mentally Ill ) (explaining that people with 
mental illness are “over-represented . . . in local jails and prisons.”); see also Fiscal 2005 
Appropriations: Hearing on S. 1194 Before the Comm. on Appropriations and Subcomm. on 
Labor, HHS, and Education (2004) (statement of Dr. Marcia Kraft Goin, President of the 
American Psychiatric Association) (explaining the problem of the alarming rate at which 
individuals with mental illness are entering the criminal justice system). 
251. 150 CONG. REC. S11263 (Oct. 11, 2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
252. Id. 
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funded by the BJA include those charged with misdemeanors and non-vio-
lent offenses.258  Also, voluntary treatment in the “least restrictive manner,” 
and the reduction in the number of sentences or types of charges are neces-
sary components when establishing a MHC with funding from the BJA.259 
D. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE MHC MODEL 
The implementation of MHCs has provoked controversy and new 
questions relating to the effectiveness of the MHC approach.260  The civil 
rights implications and the criminalization of those with mental illnesses are 
additional issues in which both proponents and critics demand responses.261  
Also, since mental illness is at issue, critics and proponents of MHCs have 
different perspectives relating to how participants in a MHC understand the 
consequences of the decision to participate in the MHC program.262  
Finally, controversy surrounds the due process concerns relating to the 
ordered treatment and its appropriateness to the defendant’s illness.263  The 
responses that proponents and critics of MHCs have about the appropriate-
ness of this new approach provide insight into the controversy surrounding 
this evolving area of the law.264 
1. Proponents’ Arguments 
Proponents of MHCs argue that processing individuals with mental 
illness through a specialized court is a more appropriate way to provide the 
services mentally ill offenders need than processing these offenders through 
the conventional court system.265  Moreover, proponents claim that the 
MHC is a pragmatic solution to dealing with social and medical problems 
underlying cases that involve mentally ill offenders.266  Also, proponents 




260. See generally Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 507-08 (noting that controversies 
have been provoked by the inception of the MHC model relating to the effectiveness and value of 
this new approach). 
261. See id. at 508-11 (indicating that critics of MHCs view them as coercive and violative 
of due process, whereas proponents view MHCs as “pragmatic solution[s]” for getting treatment 
to those who are in need of it and preventing them from going to jail). 
262. See id. (discussing different viewpoints concerning MHCs). 
263. Amy Watson et al., Mental Health Courts and the Complex Issue of Mentally Ill 
Offenders, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 477, 480-81 (2001). 
264. See Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 507-08 (discussing the value and implications 
of MHCs from the perspective of both proponents and critics). 
265. Id. at 511. 
266. Id. at 510. 
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as a diversion to further criminal behavior.267  Proponents offer statistics 
indicating a reduction in recidivism as evidence of the effectiveness of this 
model.268  For example, the Broward County MHC indicated that only 
twenty-seven percent of participants were rearrested, which suggested 
significant improvement relating to “revolving door” issues.269 
Further, proponents contend that the offense is often a result of the 
mental illness, rather than of criminality.270  Proponents maintain that many 
offenders with mental illness do not belong in the criminal justice sys-
tem.271  Those who support MHCs assert that MHCs are not discriminating 
in the adjudication of charges brought against mentally ill offenders.272  
Proponents contend that the MHCs were developed to provide a separate 
option for those eligible for a MHC program.273  In response to questions 
relating to due process rights of the defendant in a MHC, proponents point 
to the legal requirement that deciding to participate in a MHC must be 
voluntary, and the decision must not involve coercive efforts to get the 
defendant into treatment.274 
Moreover, proponents of MHCs suggest that this approach is an 
effective method of diverting individuals with mental illness away from 
jails and prisons.275  Proponents assert that MHCs are not established to 
discriminate against those mentally ill offenders who come and go through 
 
267. See PAMELA M. CASEY & DAVID B. ROTTMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., 
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: MODELS AND TRENDS 9 (2003), available at http://-
www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/COMM_ProSolProbSolvCtsPub.pdf (explaining that par-
ticipants receive more treatment in problem-solving courts, and criminal activity decreases once 
enrolled). 
268. See Acquaviva, supra note 27, at 991 (explaining the reduction in the rate of recidivism 
for participants, such as a seventy-five percent decrease for successful participants in King 
County, Washington). 
269. Id. at 990-91. 
270. See Jaime Levy Pessin, Stopping the Revolving Door: New Court Seeks New Ways to 
Provide Justice to the Mentally Ill, CHI. LAW., Mar. 2005, at 8 (noting a Cook County Judge’s 
opinion that some people are in jail because of mental illness rather than criminality); see also 
Ellen Hochstedler Steury, Specifying ‘Criminalization’ of the Mentally Disordered Misdemeanant, 
82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 334, 345 (1991) (indicating that in a study composed of 
misdemeanants, the group with psychiatric problems had more extensive criminal records than the 
group that did not have psychiatric problems). 
271. Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 514. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. at 516.  In a successful MHC, “[i]f the judge and defense attorney play their roles 
appropriately . . . the defendant will be given an informed and voluntary choice concerning 
whether to participate or to opt for routine criminal court processing.”  Id. at 519-20; see Tammy 
Seltzer, A Misguided Attempt to Address the Criminal Justice System’s Unfair Treatment of 
People with Mental Illness, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 570, 574 (2005) (explaining that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause under the U.S. Constitution, and the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to trial by jury, require that the option be voluntary). 
275. Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, 514. 
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the criminal justice system.276  As one advocate explained, “[t]he criminal 
justice system is not singling out people with mental illness and arresting 
them for conduct that others would not be arrested for.”277  If a defendant 
wants to have his or her case processed through the traditional criminal 
court process, he or she may do so.278  Additionally, supporters of MHCs 
contend that defense counsel provide a meaningful presence when deciding 
solutions to due process concerns by making sure that the options offered to 
the defendant are reasonable.279  This advocacy typically occurs as part of 
the planning process.280 
2. Opponents’ Arguments 
Despite the argument that MHCs are an effective alternative because 
they reduce recidivism in the population of mentally ill offenders, oppo-
nents argue that MHCs simply create more problems and divert resources 
from more effective solutions.281  According to Susan Stefan, a public 
interest attorney specializing in disability law, “[t]he creation of mental 
health courts to solve the problems represented by people with psychiatric 
disabilities in the criminal justice system is similar to an unhappy teenager 
deciding to have a child to solve her problems.”282  Opponents of MHCs, 
such as Stefan, assert that MHCs are just a way to provide individuals an 
opportunity to avoid facing their problems.283  Similarly, those challenging 
the effectiveness of MHCs contend that treatment plans do nothing more 
than offer medication and do not offer support in other areas such as finding 
housing or employment, which is a significant component in reducing 
recidivism among mentally ill offenders.284 
Furthermore, opponents of MHCs maintain that the criminal justice 
system is not the appropriate way to provide access to mental health care.285  
Also, because MHCs are a recent development and continually evolving, 





279. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 176-77. 
280. Id. at 177.  When problem-solving courts are implemented correctly, the courts can 
improve the quality and value of sentencing while maintaining fairness in case processing.  Id. at 
188. 
281. Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 510-11 (indicating that making mental health care 
more accessible and providing better social services are more effective than specialized courts, 
such as MHCs). 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. Seltzer, supra note 274, at 583. 
285. Id. 
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of a MHC.286  The policy considerations surrounding MHCs raise questions 
on whether there actually has been an increase in access to mental health 
care for offenders with mental illness.287  Opponents assert that MHCs 
provide a way to move “a particular group of people to the head of the line” 
leaving others in need of services at the end of the line.288 
Moreover, those opposed to the establishment of MHCs are critical of 
the procedural concerns presented.289  Critics suggest that with the prolifer-
ation of these courts “a number of procedures [must be put] in place to 
ensure a fairer balance between defendants’ constitutional rights to trial and 
legal counsel and the protection of public safety and public health.”290  
Opponents question whether mentally ill offenders are competent to make a 
voluntary choice.291 
Furthermore, the nontraditional role of the defense attorney in the 
MHC model has been viewed as controversial.292  Critics of MHCs assert 
that attorneys take on a passive role and forget their responsibilities to 
advocate for their clients.293  These procedural differences have given rise 
to questions relating to whether the constitutional rights of participants in 
the MHC are violated.294  As a Minnesota public defender noted, “I’m con-
cerned about the impact of telling the judge, the prosecutor and the 
defender that they are all in this little boat together and they have to get 
along out there on the ocean[.]”295 
Critics argue that MHCs segregate people based on psychiatric 
disability.296  In analyzing the use of sanctions in MHCs, opponents find it 
difficult to accept the use of incarceration as punishment for noncompliance 
of a treatment plan.297  Criminalization of individuals with mental illness is 
 
286. Henry J. Steadman et al., Mental Health Courts: Their Promise and Unanswered 
Questions, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 457, 458 (2001). 
287. Id. 
288. Id. 
289. Seltzer, supra note 274, at 573-75. 
290. Id. at 574. 
291. Id. 
292. See id. at 575 (suggesting that mentally ill offenders need strong advocacy by defense 
counsel to guide them through the process). 
293. Id.; see BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 180 (explaining that 
critics question the “culture of team collaboration . . . [as] hav[ing] an insidious effect on 
attorneys’ ability to engage in zealous advocacy”). 
294. See DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 19 (explaining that some defenders see a 
potential due process violation when treatment is mandated).  Critics also point out that when a 
judge has control over the type of treatment that a person receives, separation of power may be 
violated.  Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 513. 
295. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS, supra note 7, at 180. 
296. Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 512. 
297. Seltzer, supra note 274, at 579. 
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a concern to critics who note that MHCs are more punitive in nature rather 
than serving as an alternative to incarceration.298  Some critics have sug-
gested that individuals with mental illnesses are arrested and detained when 
other individuals without mental illnesses would not normally be arrested 
for the same crime.299  Finally, opponents argue that if the court supervision 
over the treatment plan exceeds what would be given during a conventional 
court process, this results in “discriminatory inequities.”300 
The controversy surrounding the MHC model has brought a range of 
questions for which both proponents and opponents believe they have 
answers.301  Despite the contrasting views, both critics and supporters ac-
knowledge the need to provide alternatives so that individuals with mental 
illness are not recycled through the criminal justice system or warehoused 
in prisons.302  Moreover, both proponents and critics recognize that individ-
uals with mental illnesses are often disconnected from mental health 
support systems and encounter the criminal justice system at an increasing 
rate.303 
VI. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA 
In many respects, North Dakota is confronting issues surrounding 
mentally ill offenders in communities across the state and those located in 
the state penitentiary.304  Overcrowding in the state prison, treating mental 
illness for jail inmates, and finding effective community alternatives are 
issues that leaders across the state examine.305  This section will provide 
insight into the issues in North Dakota relating to mentally ill offenders and 
discuss the impact of problem-solving courts, such as MHCs, in the state. 
According to the North Dakota Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (DOCR), the growth in prison population resulted in sending 
 
298. Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People With Mental Illnesses: 
The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 U. D.C.  L. REV. 143, 154-55 (2002). 
299. Id. at 155. 
300. Id. at 157.  When determining the duration of court supervision, consideration should be 
given to the treatment plan and “should never exceed the typical sentence and probationary period 
for the underlying criminal charge.”  Id. 
301. See generally Stefan & Winick, supra note 209, at 510-24 (providing arguments for and 
against the implementation of MHCs). 
302. See generally id. (discussing the importance of finding alternatives to incarceration for 
mentally ill offenders). 
303. Bernstein & Seltzer, supra note 298, at 143. 
304. See N.D. LEGIS. COUNCIL, MINUTES OF COMM’N ON ALTERNATIVES TO 
INCARCERATION, at 1-3 (Mar. 21-22, 2006), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/59-
2005/interim-info/minutes/ca032106minutes.pdf [hereinafter ALTERNATIVES, March 2006] 
(discussing the rise in inmate population at the state prison and the rise in mentally ill offenders in 
jail). 
305. Id. at 1-2. 
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inmates to be housed in jails or other private prison facilities.306  North 
Dakota had the highest increase in prison growth in the nation during 
2003.307  In April 2005, the state prison experienced an all time high of 
1386 inmates.308  Approximately thirty-seven percent of the inmate popula-
tion in North Dakota have an Axis I mental disorder.309  In response to 
these statistics, the prison system has begun to examine ways to reduce the 
increase in inmate population.310 
The Field Services Department of the North Dakota Department of 
Corrections has worked to develop strategies and create diversions to prison 
incarceration.311  Programs such as the Last Chance Program and the 
Halfway House are examples of programs established to confront the issues 
relating to offenders within the community.312  The Last Chance Program 
offers a drug treatment program to offenders who have “violated the 
conditions of supervision by using drugs or alcohol.”313  By choosing to 
participate in the program, offenders who successfully complete the 
program can avoid incarceration.314  Also, the Halfway House program 
places offenders in a halfway house as an intermediate sanction or for 
parole and probation purposes and provides specialized treatment 
programs.315  The Drug Court Program was also established to provide a 
diversion to prison incarceration for offenders with drug and substance 
abuse problems.316  Drug courts are problem-solving courts with similar 
 
306. N.D. DEP’T. OF CORR. & REHAB., BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF NORTH 
DAKOTA 2003-05, § PRISONS DIV. REPORT at 6 (2005), available at http://www.state.nd.us/ 
docr/docr/BiennialReport03-05.pdf [hereinafter DOCR]. 
307. Id. at 9.  The inmate population was increased by approximately eleven percent in 2003.  
Id.  With expectations of further population growth, the prison officials are concerned about the 
need for more prison cells.  Id. 
308. Id. at 6. 
309. E-mail from Leann K. Bertsch, Dir. of N.D. Dep’t of Corrections, to Andrea M. 
Odegaard (Oct. 2, 2006, 11:29:30 CST) (on file with author); see DSM IV, supra note 218 and 
accompanying text (indicating that Axis I mental illnesses include major mental disorders, 
learning disabilities, and developmental disabilities). 
310. See ALTERNATIVES, March 2006, supra note 304, at 1.  “Although the increasing need 
for prison beds is widespread throughout the country, . . . alternative programs that provide 
treatment and rehabilitation are a good alternative to incarcerating certain prisoners in high 
security prisons and ultimately lead to cost-savings.”  Id. 
311. DOCR, supra note 306, § Field Services Div. Report at 5.  “Alternatives to incarcer-
ation programs serve as cost-effective measures in lieu of incarceration to promote pro-social 
change in offender behavior while holding the offender accountable to their community.”  Id. 
312. Id. at 7-8. 
313. Id. at 8. 
314. Id. 
315. Id. at 7 
316. Id. at 8. 
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features to those of MHCs.317  However, drug courts focus on offenders 
charged with drug or alcohol related crimes.318 
In addition to the problem of overcrowding in the prison, county jails 
across the state are concerned with mentally ill offenders trapped in the 
“revolving door” process.319  The treatment of mentally ill offenders in jail 
can be expensive.320  For example, the Cass County Jail in Fargo, North 
Dakota spends an average of eight thousand dollars per month for offenders 
in the jail with mental illness.321  Generally, the money spent on inmates 
with mental illnesses comes from the jail budget.322  In a typical week at the 
Cass County Jail, one-fifth to a one-third of the inmates is on medication 
for mental illnesses.323  In addition, these offenders create a majority of the 
work for jail staff.324  Even when the mentally ill inmates are in the 
minority of the jail population, the jail staff spends the majority of their 
time working with the mentally ill inmates.325  With an increase in mentally 
ill jail inmates, the Cass County Jail has examined options to reduce the 
incarceration of these individuals and provide options for receiving 
treatment in the community.326 
In April 2005, the North Dakota Legislature created a commission on 
alternatives to incarceration.327  The purpose of the commission was to 
“study sentencing alternatives, mandatory sentences, treatment options, the 
expanded use of problem-solving courts, home monitoring, and other 
related issues.”328  The North Dakota Legislature created the commission to 
 
317. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 6.  Both courts use team approaches and 
include professionals from different disciplines, such as mental health or addiction counselors.  Id. 
318. Id. at 7.  Monitoring in drug courts typically involves drug testing, whereas MHCs do 
not have a specific test to determine whether the participant is adhering to the treatment plan.  Id. 
319. Tom Pantera, County Jailers Do What They Can, THE FARGO FORUM (N.D.), May 5, 
2006, at A1, A10.  Often, individuals go back to jail as a result of failing to take medications for 
their mental illness and self-medicating themselves with drugs and alcohol which, in turn, 




323. See id. (“The most common psychiatric disorders among inmates are antisocial 
personality disorder . . . and depression and anxiety.”). 
324. Id.; see Budget Blamed for Failure to Treat Mentally Ill, CORRECTIONS PROF., Aug. 11, 
2003, at 21 (indicating that a jail in South Carolina began putting mentally ill inmates on a waiting 
list to receive treatment). 
325. Pantera, supra note 319, at A10.  Often referred to as the 20-80 rule, when twenty 
percent of the jail population is comprised of people who are mentally ill, eighty percent of the jail 
staff’s time is spent working with those inmates.  Id. 
326. ALTERNATIVES, March 2006, supra note 304, at 2 (discussing the establishment of the 
Jail Intervention Coordinating Committee in Cass County as a way to identify what can be done to 
provide a diversion from incarceration for mentally ill individuals). 
327. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-35-24 (2005). 
328. Id. 
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provide “information and recommendations for the governor’s considera-
tion in time for inclusion of the recommendations in the biennial executive 
budget.”329  In March 2006, the commission heard about the possibility of a 
jail-based diversion project introduced by the Jail Intervention Coordinating 
Committee of Cass County (JICC).330  The JICC studied effective ways to 
reduce the number of incarcerations of offenders with mental illness.331  
The project proposed involved a program focused on mentally ill individ-
uals booked for a crime in which the “behavior can be addressed without 
incarceration.”332  The JICC recognized that the proposed project was 
similar to a MHC.333  However, the project is jail-based, rather than court-
based like a MHC.334  The JICC submitted an application to receive a 
federal grant for the program from the Bureau of Justice.335  In September 
2006, the Commission on Alternatives to Incarceration recommended to 
Governor Hoeven that the inclusion of $582,000 in the executive budget 
should be used in assisting the JICC in implementing its project.336  The 
receipt of these funds would be contingent on receiving the federal grant for 
the project.337 
In addition to concerns raised by officials within the North Dakota 
prison and jail systems, the judiciary also voiced concerns about the influx 
of mentally ill offenders appearing before the courts across the state.338  
Former North Dakota Supreme Court Justice, William A. Neumann, com-
mented that therapeutic justice and “problem-solving courts” have prolifer-
ated with a “more proactive role for courts in dealing with underlying 
 
329. Id. 
330. ALTERNATIVES, March 2006, supra note 304, at 1-2.  The JICC is composed of mental 
health professionals, criminal justice officials, and legislators who are interested in reducing 
incarceration of individuals with mental illness.  Id. at 2. 
331. Id. at 2. 
332. Id. 
333. Id. (testimony from the JICC at 5-6). 
334. Id. 
335. N.D. LEGIS. COUNCIL, MINUTES OF COMM’N ON ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION, 
at 1 (June 20, 2006) (testimony from the JICC at 1), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/ 
assembly/59-2005/interim-info/minutes/ca062006minutes.pdf. 
336. N.D. LEGIS. COUNCIL, MINUTES OF COMM’N ON ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION, 
at 5 (Sept. 6, 2006), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/59-2005/interim-
info/minutes/ca090606minutes.pdf [hereinafter ALTERNATIVES, Sept. 2006].  Senator Robinson 
indicated that “it is clear that there are too few individuals in treatment and too many incarcer-
ated . . . something must be done to provide flexibility for admitting an individual for treatment 
rather than incarcerating the individual.”  Id. at 4. 
337. Id. at 5. 
338. See N.D. SUPREME CT., JUDICIAL PLANNING COMM., MEETING MINUTES (Apr. 26, 
2002), http://www.court.state.nd.us/_court/committees/jud_plan/minutesapr2002.htm (noting that 
there is an increasing interest in problem-solving courts to address underlying problems with 
cases). 
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problems associated with cases.”339  Further, analyzing the appropriateness 
of specific programs involving therapeutic justice is necessary to measure 
the impact it could have on the judicial system.340  Chief Justice Gerald 
VandeWalle voiced concern about taking on additional workloads involved 
in specialized courts.341  Since problem-solving courts are “heavy users of 
judicial time,” it would be necessary to provide more judges to effectively 
operate these types of courts.342  Without sufficient resources, the effective-
ness of problem-solving courts would be undermined.343 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Because mentally ill offenders are entering the criminal justice system 
at an alarming rate, courts are considering alternative approaches to adju-
dicate cases where the underlying problem is mental illness.344  Therapeutic 
jurisprudence and problem-solving courts provide examples of how court 
structures and judicial practices have been redesigned to support a 
restorative and rehabilitative system.345  With collaboration from mental 
health and criminal justice systems, the legal process that mentally ill 
offenders confront can be designed to prevent further judicial intervention 
and provide offenders with an opportunity to be productive members of 
society.346  The establishment of MHCs is one way that therapeutic juris-
prudence has expanded the role of courts to include a rehabilitative 
process.347  Moreover, like many parts of the country, North Dakota is 
addressing the issue of mentally ill offenders who are trapped in the 
“revolving door.”348  By examining why this problem has occurred, what 
states are doing about it, and how the courts have evolved as a result, states 








344. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 2, at 7. 
345. Winick, supra note 6, at 1090. 
346. Id. at 1060-61. 
347. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 1 (noting that MHCs are a response 
to a “broad systemic problem” created by the overwhelming amount of individuals with mental 
illness in the criminal justice system). 
348. See ALTERNATIVES, Sept. 2006, supra note 336 and accompanying text (explaining the 
problem of individuals with mental illness in jail and prison). 
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effective approach to dealing with issues relating to offenders who are 
mentally ill.349 
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